The idea that constitutional conventions exist outside of the bounds of courts and are injusticiable can be quite frustrating for many political scientists and politicians. Conventions are best viewed as a set of governmental traditions or norms that while not legally binding are often socially binding through votes of confidence (Rozenberg, 1998). They are to be viewed as a political aberration that exist in large numbers in both the British and U.S. systems of government. There is no agreed-upon system for dealing with questions arising from the topic of constitutional conventions, yet these very same conventions, by nature, adhere to the cultural, legal, and social norms and morals of the society, which the executive oversees.
There is no singular perspective from which to view constitutional conventions. They help government to run smoothly by creating both highly adaptable and highly indefinable sets of executive responsibilities that cannot be enforced by the courts. There have even been some very landmark cases that have tested this characteristic and each and every time, as we have seen with AG v Cape, constitutional conventions, and their jurisdiction over government operation, have been indirectly justified...
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